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Abstract: 
Empirical research has made progress in developing indicators for the measurement of 
technological competences. A so far unmet challenge, however, is to trace the patterns of 
relationships among key variables at the firm level as they unfold in the context of the 
industry dynamics. The aim of the present paper is therefore to develop the methodology 
required to search for patterns of relationships among such key variables (R&D investments, 
technology and performance), to trace these patterns over time and thereby unfold the 
underlying industry dynamics. We are here referring to the possibility of using statistical 
methods such as Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) to trace similarities and dissimilarities 
among a set of variables - as opposed to testing simple linear and non-linear causal relations. 
We extend the previous use of MDS to further include what is known as "external unfolding." 
Using this proposed methodology, we derive an "industry space" that allows identification of 
the tendency to form groups, and to infer the stability of such groups of firms sharing similar 
conditions. 
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1. UNFOLDING THE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 
Both the theoretical (Dierickx and Cool (1989), Nelson (1991), Dosi and Marengo (1993)) 
and the empirical relationship (Malerba and Marengo (1995), Schmoch (1995), Patel and 
Pavitt (1998)) between technology, R&D and performance have been at the centre of attention 
in numerous strategic management studies. Over time, the theoretical arguments have shifted 
in focus, from early arguments favouring a linear relationship between R&D and performance 
(e.g. Kamien & Schwartz (1975)) to recent efforts emphasising the cumulative effects of 
R&D investments on profitability (e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982)). According to the latter 
process-based perspective numerous firm-specific learning effects associated with 
competence accumulation complicate the relation between R&D and performance. Recent 
studies often view such complications as multiple history-dependent firm-specific processes 
that frustrate attempts of uncovering any simple empirical relation between R&D investment 
and financial performance (David (1994), Levinthal (1996), Dosi (1988)). 
 
If we accept this recent process-based argument, both the indirect effect of competence 
accumulation, as well as the direct effect of R&D will influence performance. Empirical 
research has made progress in developing indicators for the measurement of technological 
competences but has not yet refined the statistical methods to match the level of sophistication 
of the recent process-based theoretical explanations, however.2 In particular, a so far unmet 
challenge for empirical research is to trace the patterns of relationships among key variables 
such as firm-level R&D investments, technology and performance as they unfold in the 
context of the industry dynamics created by the mutual interaction of the industry members. 
                                                 
2
 Patents have almost exclusively been applied to the study of technological competences see e.g. Leiponen 
(1998), Patel and Pavitt (1998) and Miyazaki (1994). A second source of information is questionnaire-based 
measures of organisational and/ or technological competences see e.g. Bove, Harmsen and Grunert (2000), 
Malerba and Marengo (1995) and Lin (1997). 
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The aim of this paper is therefore to develop the methodology required to search for patterns 
of relationships between innovation measured by investment in R&D, technology measured 
by patents, and financial performance measured by turnover. It is further the aim to trace these 
patterns over time and thereby unfold the underlying industrial dynamics. Notice that the 
primary aim is to develop the methodology that is then applied to the case of 
telecommunications as one illustrative case. 
 
The suggestion made here is to apply the statistical method of Multidimensional Scaling 
(henceforth MDS) and to extend it with what is known as external unfolding. The MDS-
analysis enables us to trace similarities and dissimilarities among a set of variables – as 
opposed to testing simple linear and non-linear causal relations. The proposed methodology 
allows for the identification of groups of firms according to patterns of similarities in 
relationships among key variables, to infer the underlying evolving competence trajectories 
leading to the formation of groups, and to deduce the stability of such groups of firms. 
 
These issues are important because the possible identification of stable patterns of similarities 
in the relation between superior performance and technological competence may have 
important implications for management of technology. This paper applies the newly 
introduced method to explore whether such patterns can actually be identified among sixteen 
multinational companies within the telecom industry, and discusses the associated 
implications for management of technology. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on technological competence 
in a process-based perspective, section 3 presents the data used in the present study, and 
section 4 describes the proposed use of MDS to unfold industry dynamics. Sections 5 and 6 
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present the results of the analyses and section 7 concludes and outlines implications for future 
research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Common to various process-based perspectives (e.g. Dynamic Capabilities see Teece, Pisano 
and Shuen (1994) and (1997) and evolutionary economics Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi 
and Marengo (1994), Levinthal and Myatt (1994)) on the organisational determinants of the 
firm’s ability to search for, choose among and utilise emerging opportunities is that numerous 
firm-specific learning effects associated with competence accumulation are viewed as 
complications in the relation between R&D and performance.3 One of these complications is 
that firms need to both allocate resources to further refinement of the existing production-set 
and to integrate new elements in this set (March 1991).4 It is further commonly asserted that 
such complications involve multiple history-dependent organisational processes that frustrate 
attempts of uncovering any simple empirical relation between R&D investment and financial 
performance.  
 
Learning is a painstaking process of trial and error in which the current state of the firm limits 
the set of possible future paths (path dependence) each of which lead to a distinct future state 
(Cohen and Levinthal (1990), David (1994), Levinthal and March (1993)). These processes of 
trial and error define a path-dependent dynamics according to which the development of the 
                                                 
3
 The state of learning a firm has achieved at a particular time-step has variously been described by its 
“absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), “competences” (Nelson 1991) and “capabilities” (Teece and 
Pisano 1994). 
4
 This tension is also known as the trade-off between exploration and exploitation (March 1991). Considering a 
distribution of learning draws, exploitation is associated with the mean of the learning process and exploration is 
associated with the variance. Exploration is therefore associated with the creation of new competences, high 
rates of employee turnover, as well as high levels of risk and innovation. By contrast, exploitation is associated 
with the refinement of existing competences and involves the reduction of risk. Both exploitation and 
exploration are associated with tendencies towards lock-in. 
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firm, e.g. the probability of expansion and contraction, in each time-step depends on its 
previous state. Such path-dependent dynamics is commonly associated with persistent firm 
level heterogeneity.5  
 
In the face of path-dependent learning processes, it is further unlikely that uniquely 
determined outcomes are possible. In particular, this process-based view implies that we 
should not, in theory or practice, expect optimality in the mix of R&D expenditures, 
technological competence and economic performance. Instead, a variety of relationships may 
turn out to yield a comparable (high) level of economic performance. In the following, we 
will briefly review a sample of recent empirical studies that appear to support this view. 
 
Using R&D expenditures and US patents of 500 global companies in 1990 and 1998 
Bowonder et al. (2000: 55) applied a technology trajectory approach to show that the so-
called global firms are increasing both the scope and depth of the dominant patent classes. 
Their results further indicate that the development of technological competences measured by 
patents is cumulative and depends on both the existing knowledge and the implementation of 
new knowledge. Bowonder et al. (2000) did not attempt to uncover whether any possible 
combined effects of R&D and patents influenced the performance of these firms, however. In 
a related study, Leiponen (1998) examined the contribution of different facets of competence 
(measured by patents and technical skills acquired through education) as determinants of 
profitability and reported a positive association between profitability and the different 
measures of competence. Dividing the sample into innovators and non-innovators further 
increased the strength of the effects. Unfortunately, Leiponen did not include measures of 
R&D expenditures that might untangle the possible mediating or moderating effect of 
                                                 
5
 Note here that firm-level heterogeneity does not necessarily imply path-dependence. For example, a simple 
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innovation. Malerba and Marengo (1995) used survey data to study how the technological 
competences of the Italian manufacturing industry influence firm performance. Based on a 
distinction between the competences needed for long-term versus short-term strategies, they 
found that ‘in high technology sectors, technological competences are considered by firms as 
the most relevant ones for their long term strategies and competitiveness’ (Malerba and 
Marengo 1995 :475). The validity of this finding must be questioned, however, since the 
performance measure was based on the firms’ subjective perception of own competitiveness. 
Finally, underlining the measurement problems inherent in empirical research on 
technological change, Lin (1997: 135) identified a number of elements of corporate 
technological capability but used crude measures to tap these constructs, constraining the 
empirical test to simple statistics that did not quite meet the study’s sophisticated theoretical 
structure.  
 
In summary, all the empirical studies referred to in the previous paragraph report that either 
technological competence, R&D expenditure or performance are pair wise related. None of 
these studies, however, aim to combine all three measures or to unfold the underlying 
industrial dynamics implied by the studies’ different but rather sophisticated process-based 
theoretical models. 
 
As mentioned above, a number of studies have recently emphasised that path-dependent 
processes lead to persistent firm level heterogeneity; a view that is consistent with arguments 
offered by the Resource Based View (RBV), the dominating strategy (content) paradigm over 
the last decade (Foss and Knudsen 2001, Foss 1998). Proponents of the Resource Based View 
(Peteraf (1993), Barney (1991)) have argued that firm-level heterogeneity is possible in 
                                                                                                                                                        
stochastic process may be the source of persistent firm-level heterogeneity (Knudsen 2001). 
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equilibrium. This view seems to be supported by a large number of empirical studies 
reporting persistent firm-level differences in performance (e.g. Rumelt (1991), Geroski et. al. 
(1997), Jensen and McGuckin (1997), McGahan and Porter, (1997), Goddard and Wilson 
(1999), Eriksen and Knudsen (2001)). The findings reported in these studies are further 
consistent with a number of studies reporting persistent firm-level differences in technological 
competence (Patel and Pavitt (1995), Malerba et. al. (1997), Cefis (1999)).  
 
The existence of persistent differences in performance and technological competence reported 
in the above empirical studies suggest that firm-level similarities in the unobservable relation 
between both of these variables are promising candidates for the identification of possible 
groups of firms sharing similar competitive conditions.6 Consistent with this view, Jensen and 
McGuckin (1997: 28) argue that ‘the majority of this variation [in performance] is not 
associated with traditional observables such as location, industry, size, age or capital; rather 
it is associated with unobserved firm- or business unit-specific factors, many of which appear 
to be long-loved attributes of the business unit.’ Along the same lines Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000: 1106) observe that capabilities exhibit commonalities across firms, implying that they 
are more homogenous and substitutable than traditional RBV thinking implies7. Thus, the 
unobservable firm-level heterogeneity particularly in technological competence may be an 
important determinant of persistent firm-level differences in performance and may, combined 
with homogeneity in problem solving routines, allow for an identification of clusters of firms 
in an industry space. 
As mentioned earlier, path dependence is a crucial characteristic of competence accumulation 
associated with firm level specialisation. In a study of the opto-electronics industry, Miyazaki 
                                                 
6
 Groupings of firms have been discussed in at least two settings. The first is the notion of ‘Strategic Groups’ by 
Porter (1980) applied by e.g. Peteraf and Shanley (1997); the second is ‘Competence groups’ as defined by 
Gorman, Thomas and Sanchez (1996) and applied by e.g. Knudsen (2000). 
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(1994) used bibliometric data, US patent data and interview data to show that firm-level path 
dependence in the accumulation of capabilities is in fact associated with technological 
specialisation. Increased specialisation tends to lock the firms in to a particular learning path 
associated with superior or inferior performance (March (1991), Ingram and Baum (1997), 
Dosi and Marengo (1993)). 
 
Although the argument that firms experiencing consistent low performance only with great 
difficulty can adapt to improve performance is controversial (Levinthal and Myatt 1994), this 
viewpoint seems to be supported by a number of empirical studies. Miyazaki (op. cit.: 653) 
finds that ‘firms search over broader horizon initially and are able gradually to narrow down 
their search through a painstaking learning process,’ which may happen to be fatal. In a 
study based on patent data, Fai (1999: 16) finds that large firms possess the required resources 
to diversify into new technological sectors, but may, due to the possibility of relatively lower 
costs in the short term, prefer to further the activities within their prior accumulated 
technological competences. Although the firm initially experiments with a broad set of 
competences, the effects of short-term positive feedback may lead to high levels of 
specialisation within an increasingly narrow range of competences (Levinthal and March 
1993). Since specialisation in competence is usually associated with increasing rigidity, the 
firm may find that it is stuck in a competency trap, a situation in which the firm’s narrowly 
specialised competences become obsolete as the world changes to favour alternative 
competences (Dosi and Malerba (1996), Levitt and March (1988), Tushman and Anderson 
(1986)). That is, firms will tend to restrict themselves to a limited set of technological 
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competences and have difficulty in responding to developments outside this range of 
competence (Levinthal and Myatt 1994: 49).8 
 
In summary, the above review indicates that path-dependence in accumulation of firm-
specific competences, from a theoretical viewpoint, may be associated with persistent 
heterogeneity in performance at the firm level. A number of empirical studies support this 
view of persistent performance differentials and further indicate that the accumulation of 
(technological) competences and investments in R&D are promising candidates as 
antecedents to performance. Previous empirical studies have tested the degree to which 
performance differentials among firms in an industry are sustained over time and the relative 
importance of industry and firm-specific effects (including abstract unspecified effects as well 
as technological competence) as determinants of sustained differences in performance. 
Empirical research has also made progress in developing indicators for the measurement of 
technological competences. A so far unmet challenge, however, is to trace the patterns of 
relationships among key variables as they unfold in the context of the industry dynamics 
created by the mutual interaction of industry members. Interestingly, the interaction between 
the firm level and the industry level has moved out of focus after the success of Porter in 
addressing issues of competitive strategy and diversity across industries (Porter 1980).9 Even 
though the substantial relation between the external environment and internal resources is 
prevalent in the literature (Levinthal (1994), Henderson and Mitchell (1997), Rumelt (1991)) 
the impact of the interaction among firms upon the industrial dynamics is by and large un-
researched. In the following we address this issue by developing an MDS-based methodology 
that uses what is known as “external unfolding” to track the dynamics of the relations among 
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 Levinthal (1994: 171) explains the effect of a competence trap as 'increasing skill at the current procedures 
makes experimentation with alternatives progressively less attractive' thereby underlining the difficulty in 
actively escaping a competence trap even if it becomes fully recognized. 
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the key variables: R&D investments, technology and performance. We first present the data, a 
sample of the most influential telecom firms, and then the proposed methodology. 
 
3. DATA AND OPERATIONALISATION 
For two reasons, the present paper focuses on technological competences in the telecom 
industry. First, because of the cumulative and idiosyncratic nature of technological 
competence emphasised by Henderson (2000), such competences are likely to be a 
particularly important aspect of the competence profile of a firm in both the telecom industry 
and in other high-tech industries. Because technological competences are cumulative and 
idiosyncratic they are difficult to transfer across organisations and therefore likely 
determinants of persistent differences in firm-level performance.10 Second, because the 
telecom industry is a very dynamic high-tech industry, continued updating of technological 
competences may be necessary for survival even in the short term (Praest 1998: chapter 7) 
and competence traps may be fatal. The study of the emerging relation between technological 
competence and firm-level performance among firms struggling for a favourable position 
within the telecom industry thus provides a rich context for the application of our proposed 
unfolding analysis. 
 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the proposed MDS unfolding analysis is to trace the 
patterns of relationships among key variables (R&D, technological competence and 
performance) as they unfold in the context of the industry dynamics created by the mutual 
interaction of the industry members. This procedure is used because we view an industry as a 
dynamic environment in which the transfer of technological competence among co-operators 
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as well as the attempts to imitate, outpace and outwit competitors will shape the development 
of the firm’s technological competence (Henderson and Mitchell (1997: 8), Sutton (1998), 
Tirole (1988)). It is therefore important to focus on a single industry (because of sector 
differences), to include a measure of the competitors’ activities (we use the specialisation 
index described below to do this) and to assess the stability of the industry dynamics (this is 
the purpose of the MDS unfolding analysis). In addition, the MDS analysis allows for 
individual assessments of the firms' relative positions in the industry space. 
 
The sample used in the present study includes sixteen multinational companies within the 
telecom hardware manufacturing industry. For each company, the data includes a time series 
of three objective measures for the period 1986-1994: (1) innovation measured by investment 
in R&D, (2) technology measured by patent applications, and (3) financial performance 
measured by turnover.11 The individual company profiles are adjusted on an annual basis to 
take all new acquisitions into account and to exclude all divestitures. 
 
The patent applications used to measure a company’s technology (a strategic attribute) cover 
the European Patent Office (EPO) and the World Patents during the period 1986-1994. The 
patent data were selected in a 3-step sequence. First, the technological field of 
telecommunications12 was defined using the International Patent Classification (IPC). Second, 
the patent applications were identified in both EPO and the World Patent Index (WPIL) for 
the period 1986-94. These data were pooled in three intervals: 1: 1986-88, 2: 1986-91, and 3: 
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 This claim that firm-specific effects dominate industry specific effects is consistently supported in empirical 
studies (Rumelt (1991), McGahan and Porter (1997), Eriksen and Knudsen 2001). 
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 However, some of the financial data have not been available and the firms have been excluded accordingly. 
The affected firms are from 1986-89 Matsushita, Philips, IBM and Alcatel and in both 1986-89 and 1986-94 are 
Sony and Toshiba. 
12
 In this paper, we exclude technologies with a peripheral connection to telecom. The exact definition can be 
obtained from the authors. 
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1986-94.13 The estimation of one period included all subsequent periods, i.e. the estimation of 
period 3 included both periods 1 and 2, whereas period 1 did not include other periods. Third, 
an index of technological specialisation (RPA) was calculated.14 This technological 
specialisation index, calculated on the basis of the number of patent applications, is used as an 
indicator of a firm’s technological competence.  
 
Although patents do not capture all aspects of technological competence in a firm, patents 
remain the unique best objective measure of such competence.15 Furthermore, because patent 
data are disaggregated measures they provide a useful basis for an objective assessment of the 
degree of technological specialisation in a population of firms. The IPC ensures that the 
patent attorney assigns each application accurately to the firm and to the appropriate 
technology class. 
 
The economic data used in the present study include measures of R&D expenditures (a 
strategic attribute) and turnover (a performance measure).16 The data are normalised in order 
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Where P=number of patent applications in that period; i=company (ranges from 1 to 16) and j=technological 
field. RPA is symmetric in the interval [-100: 100] with a neutral value of 0. This measure is derived from the 
revealed trade advantage as defined by Soete and Wyatt (1983). 
15
 An extensive debate has raged about the use and abuse of patent data to measure technological change and 
technological competences. However, as stated by Griliches (1991: 1702): 'patent statistics remain a unique 
resource for the analysis of the process of technical change. Nothing else even comes close in the quantity of 
available data, accessibility, and the potential industrial, organizational and technological detail'. We shall not 
go further into the debate but merely comply with the above quote. For further references please see e.g. Pavitt 
(1988), Grupp (1998), Grupp and Schmoch (1999) or OECD (1994). 
16
 We also conducted analyses including net income. The results of the two first periods are similar to the 
analyses using the turnover measure of performance reported in the present study. For the last period, however, 
exogenous factors (e.g. tax) are most likely the sources of deviation from the results reported here. 
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to establish compatibility across firms and across countries. We use the following two 
normalisation procedures. First, the number of employees is used as a weight to adjust for 
differences in firm size, and second, the purchasing power parity (PPP) converts all data into 
US $.17 An alternative method to normalise currencies is to use exchange rates, but these tend 
to be easily influenced by general economic turbulence, like changes in oil prices. It must be 
noted that a problem with the use of the PPP is the bias in favour of the American firms 
relative to all other nationalities. Since this bias tends to be smaller than the bias associated 
with the use of exchange rates, we used the PPP to normalise currencies. 
 
The goodness of the possible alternative indicators of performance has inspired ongoing 
debate and the issue does not appear to be settled.18 Our rationale is not based on the logic of 
sustained competitive advantage, however.19 Rather, we aim to trace regularities in the 
patterns of relationships among key variables (firm-level R&D investments, technology and 
performance) as they unfold in the context of the industry dynamics. Allowing for period-by-
period variation, we wish to identify some possible common characteristic in the relationships 
among key variables. For this purpose the present paper uses a non-standard performance 
measure, namely specialisation in turnover. 
 
The use of lag structures in estimating a relationship between input and output has been 
discussed, among others, by Grupp and Maital (1996: 12), who used a 4-year lag. In a 
turbulent industry like telecom characterised by short technology lifecycles, a lag structure of 
2 years seems appropriate. In the present study, we therefore use a lag of 2 years, which 
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 The purchasing power parities (PPP) were obtained from the OECD publication on ‘Main Science and 
Technology Indicators’ (1997). 
18
 See for instance Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) and Chakravarthy (1986) for overviews of different 
approaches to measuring performance. For the relations among R&D, patents and performance see Tidd and 
Driver (2000) 
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implies that a comparison between technological specialisation and turnover is based on 
patent applications in the period 1986-88 and turnover in the year 1989. Accordingly the 
economic data were obtained for the years 1989 (matching the patent applications of 1986-
88), 1992 and 1995 (matching patent applications of 1986-91 and 1986-94 respectively). 
Having presented the data, we next describe the proposed refinement of the MDS 
methodology that was used in previous studies. 
 
4. DEVELOPING THE MDS-ANALYSIS 
The purpose of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) and related techniques, such as 
Correspondence Analysis, is to derive useful spatial representations of relationships among 
data. MDS generally attempts to represent certain types of data as relations on points in a 
multidimensional space (Green, Carmone et al. 1989). The MDS analysis derives the 
dimensions of the space as well as the relations among the data points. Often MDS is used to 
derive a space on the basis of subjective evaluations of a number of attributes, in which case 
the derived attribute space is referred to as a perceptual space (Bijmolt and Wedel 1999). Here 
we use objective data and refer to the derived attribute space as an “industry space”. 
 
In the present study, we use MDS to derive a spatial representation of the relations among the 
objective variables, firm-level R&D investments, firm level technology and firm level 
performance thereby inferring the industry space. The multidimensional attribute space we 
derive is therefore an industry-space representing the telecom industry. By using MDS, we 
obtain a map of the relations on points representing the firms of the telecom industry. That is, 
we obtain a map that shows the degree of overlap in the firms’ strategic attributes. If the 
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 SCA is known from RBV (Peteraf 1993) and has been translated into long-term performance in empirical 
research. 
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points representing two firms happen to have similar coordinates in the derived map, we say 
that the two firms pursue similar strategies. More generally, we can use the derived map to 
assess whether there is a tendency to form strategic groups (a tendency for points to cluster) 
or not (no tendency for points to cluster).  
 
Having derived the industry-space, we further proceed to include the performance measure. 
Adding the performance measure, the derived industry-space now portrays similarities in 
strategic attributes (R&D investments and technology) and the consequences of a particular 
choice of attributes in terms of performance. The derived industry-space is therefore a joint 
attribute and performance space and the coordinates of a particular point in this space 
represent the relative position of a firm in the telecom industry.  
 
In order to further a more detailed assessment of the dynamics of the patterns of relations 
among firms in the derived industry-space, we applied what is known as external unfolding.  
That is, we used regression analysis to fit vectors representing both of the strategic attributes 
and the performance measure. In previous applications of MDS the axes of the attribute space 
have been less than easy to interpret. By fitting the regression vectors in the industry space the 
interpretation has become straightforward. The information gained thereby includes: (1) the 
relative position of the attribute vectors indicating whether strategies are independent or 
interdependent, (2) the relative position of the performance vector and the strategic attributes, 
and (3) an assessment of each firm’s strategy and its consequences. Note that the vectors are 
fitted in industry-space and represent industry-level properties derived on the basis of the 
relations among all individual firm level variables.  
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By next analysing how the points shift over time within this space, we can trace the industry 
dynamics as emerging patterns of relations among firms. By further applying the external 
unfolding analysis, we also gain information about the changing relative position of the 
industry level attribute and performance vectors. This information enables us to trace the 
patterns of relationships among firm level R&D investments, technology and performance as 
they unfold in the context of the industry dynamics created by the mutual interaction of the 
industry members.  
 
The purpose of the proposed methodology is to provide a tool that can trace industry 
dynamics and strategic change without the need to impose strong and perhaps unreasonable 
fitting constraints (e.g. as in the usual regression analysis). The general idea of using MDS to 
analyse industry dynamics was originally proposed by Green and Carmone (1968) to assess 
the product life cycle in industrial markets. We believe Green and Carmone’s (1968) idea is 
also a promising candidate for a meaningful and detailed portrayal of strategic change in 
industrial markets. By adding the possibility of assessing the relative change of industry-level 
strategic dimensions we have further refined Green and Carmone’s (1968) outline of a 
methodology for the analysis of dynamic change. Moreover, this proposition allows for new 
ways of tracing dynamic patterns of technological change and thus to analyse the theoretical 
propositions of the process-based approach more directly. We next turn to demonstrating how 
our proposed methodology can be used to analyse the unfolding industry dynamics within the 
telecom industry. 
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5. RESULTS 
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 present the industry-space derived on the basis of the MDS-analysis 
for each of the three periods 1986-88, 1989-91, and 1992-94.20 In each instance, the derived 
industry space is a joint attribute and performance space and the coordinates of the points in 
this space represent the relative position of a particular firm in the telecom industry for each 
of the three periods in question. The three arrows are the result of the unfolding analysis. 
These arrows were fitted to the map by regression analyses and are vectors representing both 
of the strategic attributes and the performance measure. As described in the following, the fit 
of each of the MDS-analyses as well as the fit of the unfolding analyses were excellent.  
 
The fit of each MDS-analysis was assessed on the basis of the proportion of variance of the 
disparities accounted for in the MDS-model. Here we report the squared correlations (RSQ) 
computed on the basis of Young’s S-stress formula. The RSQ estimates for the 1989- and 
the1995-model were in both instances 0.99998. For the 1992 model the RSQ was 0.99988. 
These values of fit are remarkably high indicating high validity of the three MDS models that 
were estimated. Here it is important to note that the recommended guideline to obtain a stable 
solution and to avoid inflated fit measures is to have more than four times as many objects as 
dimensions desired (Green, Carmone et al. 1989). Since we have two dimensions but only 
three objects for each analysis shown in Figure 5.1 to 5.3 this recommended guideline is 
clearly violated.  
 
We therefore estimated a baseline model including all 9 objects (3 objects for each time 
period) in joint space.  
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 Based on the specialisation data in appendix A. 
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Figure 5.1: Industry space with attribute vectors 1989
ATT
BOSCH
ERICSSONFUJITSU
GEC
HITACHI
MOTOROLANEC
NOKIA
SIEMENS
a-pat
a-RD
a-turn
Figure 5.2: Industry space with attribute vectors 1992
SIEMENS
PHILIPS
NOKIANEC MOTOROLAMATSUSHITA
IBM
HITACHI
GEC
FUJITSU
ERICSSON
BOSCH
ATT
ALCATEL
a-pat
a-RD
a-turn
Figure 5.3: Industry space with attribute vectors 1995
ALCATEL
ATT
BOSCH
ERICSSON
FUJITSU
GECHITACHI
IBM
MATSUSHITA
MOTOROLA
NEC
NOKIA
PHILIPS
SIEMENS
SONY
TOSHIBA
a-pat
a-RD
a-turn
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Since this baseline model respects the recommended guideline and since it obtained an RSQ 
of 0.99980, a value very close to each of the three individual analyses, we conclude that the fit 
values of the individual analyses are not inflated and that a high degree of stability was 
obtained. This result supports that we obtained a high degree of validity also in each of the 
three MDS-analyses for 1989, 1992, and 1995. 
 
In the external unfolding analysis the attribute and performance variables were regressed on 
the derived stimulus coordinates. In each of the regressions we obtained a very good fit 
(RSQ's in the order: patents, R&D and turnover, for 1989 are 0.999; 0.994; 1.0, for 1992 are 
0.998; 0.984; 1.0 and for 1995 are 0.999; 0.991; 1.0) that demonstrates a high degree of 
validity of the unfolding analysis. We now proceed to a more detailed description of the 
industry dynamics on the basis of each of the three individual maps.  
 
5.1 The relationship between technology and performance: A view of the industry 
By inspection of Figures 5.1 to 5.3 below, note first that the industry-level vectors 
representing patents (a-pat) and R&D (a-RD) are located closely, almost overlapping, whereas 
the performance vector (a-turn) is crossing the two others. In the following we refer to the 
overlapping patent and R&D vectors as technology vectors and the performance vector as the 
“turnover vector.” The directions of the vectors shown in Figures 5.1 to 5.3 indicate relative 
levels of attributes or performance. Higher levels are obtained in the direction each vector 
points to. The maps represent industry spaces and the individual points represent firms. A 
particular firm’s relative position on a vector can be read directly of the map by drawing the 
perpendicular projection from the point representing the firm to the vector. In Figure 5.1, 
representing the period 1986-88, Ericsson, for example, has the highest level of performance 
(turnover), Motorola the second highest, and Hitachi the lowest. 
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A high position on the turnover vector (e.g. Ericsson) indicates that the firm, relative to other 
firms in the telecom industry, obtains a large share of its turnover from telecommunications. 
Therefore, a very high position on the turnover vector implies a potential risk associated with 
radical changes in the market. Moreover, a low level of turnover does not necessarily indicate 
low absolute levels of turnover, but only shows that the firm in question (e.g. Hitachi), 
relative to the other industry members, has a low level of specialisation.  
 
Similarly, a high position on the technology vectors (e.g. Ericsson or Motorola) indicates a 
high level of technological specialisation relative to other firms in the industry. Note that a 
high level of technological specialisation without a corresponding high level of economic 
specialisation points to an inability to continue the required level of investments in the future. 
A low level of technological specialisation may for a different reason indicate the exit of the 
industry since this position implies a very high need for financing the continued updating of 
technological competences. Below, in Figure 6.1, we further consider the possible exit 
dynamics of the telecom industry. 
 
By studying Figures 5.1 and 5.2 we observe a shift of the two technology vectors from 1989 
to 1992 in which the patent vector moves closer to the turnover vector. To obtain a better 
estimate of this change, we computed the angles of the vectors. According to these estimates 
shown in Table 5.1, the angles between the patent vector and the R&D vector respectively to 
the turnover vector are fairly stable.21 However, the angle between the patent and the R&D 
vectors diminish indicating slightly increased co-variation and thus higher interdependence 
                                                 
21
 Orthogonal vectors indicate that the dimensions are completely independent. By contrast, perfectly 
overlapping vectors indicate complete dependence. We further claim that a smaller angle between the technology 
vectors indicates a more stable configuration. The reason is that, in this instance, in order to gain an additional 
increment of turnover, an increasing share of the firm’s resources must be allocated to the particular industry in 
question (e.g. telecommunications). That is, a firm must either exit or will tend to become increasingly 
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between the two dimensions of technology. The increased co-variation between R&D and 
patents is in line with the correlations reported in previous studies (see section 2 above). 
 
Table 5.1: The angle22 (in degrees) between the industry level vectors 
 1989 1992 1995 
Patent – R&D 16,6 11,0 12,8 
Patent – turnover 59,2 62,0 58,7 
R&D – turnover 57,1 63,5 59,9 
 
5.2 Technological competence and performance: Firm level dynamics 
In 1989, Motorola and Ericsson are positioned in the area of high specialisation in turnover 
and technology, with NEC lying on the boundary of that domain. Ericsson is a high tech 
company known for its success in the telecommunication product market. For all the three 
periods, Ericsson’s product market success is reflected by its favourable position in the 
industry space derived in the present paper. In 1989 both Nokia and Hitachi contrast Ericsson 
in being positioned at relatively modest levels of turnover and technological specialisation. 
Subsequently, there is a dramatic shift in Nokia’s position.  
 
Until the beginning of the 1980es Nokia was only present to a very limited degree in the 
telecommunications market. This is reflected in Nokia’s position in Figure 5.1 by low levels 
of technological specialisation and performance during 1986-1988. As shown in Figure 5.2, 
Nokia was subsequently during 1989-91 able to develop a more favourable position with high 
                                                                                                                                                        
specialised within an industry in which all technology vectors overlap. This dynamics tend to a stable 
configuration with a few large competitors. 
22
 The following formula was used to calculate the angle between two vectors:  
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levels of technological as well as economic specialisation. As shown in Figure 5.3 Nokia then 
managed to further marginally strengthen this position during 1992-94. 
 
Despite the dramatic shift in Nokia’s position, the general observation is that there are few 
changes in the relative position among the firms in the telecom industry. By inspection of 
Figures 5.1 to 5.3, a total of only 6 moves (by 5 companies) are observed during the periods 
1986-94. These moves are23: 
 
1989 to 1992: Fujitsu moves from I to IV 
  GEC moves from II to I 
  Nokia moves from IV to III 
  NEC moves from boundary of I/III to III 
1992 to 1995: Fujitsu moves back from IV to I 
  AT&T moves from II to III 
 
Thus, a second result is the apparent stability in the configuration of the maps; only few firms 
change their position indicating that the relationship between R&D, patents and turnover is 
stable over time. This result is consistent with the arguments offered by proponents of the 
Resource Based View referred to in the above.24  
 
In order to validate the findings of the present study, we compare with a study by Schmoch 
(1995) using a partly overlapping sample. Unfortunately, Schmoch’s (1995) study ends at that 
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, where ai and bi refer to the coordinates of the MDS solution. 
23
 The numbers refer to figure 6.1 in section 6 – see below. 
24
 Praest’s (1998: 141) study conducted on the sample of firms also used in the present study provides further 
evidence on the observed persistency in the accumulation of technological competences at the firm level. 
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point in time where we pick up (in 1989). So the comparison is limited to matching our results 
for 1989 with the final period of Schmoch’s (1995) study. Using MDS-analysis on 
technological specialisation profiles, Schmoch (1995) identified three groups of firms in the 
telecom industry. The first group comprised the large well-established firms (Siemens, 
Alcatel and Ericsson) at the core of the telecom industry. The two other groups identified by 
Schmoch (1995) were located at the periphery of the telecom industry. These two peripheral 
groups consisted in 1989 of IBM, Fujitsu, NEC and Sony, Philips, Bosch, respectively. 
Furthermore, Schmoch identified a group of newcomers, including Nokia, Sony, Matsushita, 
Bosch and Toshiba, which entered the industry from other related areas of information 
technology (Schmoch 1995: 436). The positions of the newcomers in Schmoch’s (1995) study 
were cutting across the three established groups of firms.  
 
The comparison shows that Nokia’s as well as Bosch’s position are similar in both Schmoch’s 
(1995) and our analyses. In a further analysis, Schmoch included the R&D expenditure per 
turnover in the maps (however not as an independent dimension as we do). Consistent with 
the findings of the present study, Schmoch (1995: 437-438) observed that the highly 
specialised firms in telecom had high shares of R&D to turnover, whereas the group of 
newcomers had much lower shares of R&D to turnover. This result supports our finding that 
there is a high degree of co-variation between R&D and technological specialisation. As 
Schmoch (1995: 438) observed, ‘the question is open in how far this relatively low R&D 
share can be maintained in the future’. This question is a further issue to be addressed in the 
following section. 
 
In summary, the results of the present study support previous studies arguing that persistent 
firm-level attributes are sources of persistent differences of performance among firms within 
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an industry. The results obtained in the present study applied a specialisation measure on two 
technological dimensions (strategic attributes) and one performance dimension (specialisation 
in turnover). The MDS-analysis further used an external unfolding procedure in which the 
positions of the individual firm over time are derived, not just from the moves of the firm 
itself, but also from the changes in the environment brought about by the interaction among 
the firms in the telecom industry. Therefore, a stable and persistent pattern requires a 
continued strategic pursuit of a particular economic and technological combination for all 
firms in the industry. The present study has therefore demonstrated, albeit on a small sample, 
that the stability in performance differentials found in previous studies e.g. Rumelt (1991), 
McGahan and Porter (1997) and Eriksen and Knudsen (2001) reflects persistence at the level 
of firm-specific strategic attributes. This result is consistent with the general claims of the 
Resource Based View. It would therefore be important to apply the methodology proposed in 
the present study to a large-scale empirical study. We will leave this question for future 
research and now turn to Schmoch’s (1995) open question regarding the possibility that a firm 
may, for some reason, sustain a relatively low R&D share for a longer period of time. 
 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS 
According to the results presented above, the firm-level strategic attributes as well as the 
economic performance of most firms of the telecom industry were persistent during the entire 
period spanned by the analysis. Consistent with this finding, there were very few moves (a 
total of 6 out of 24 possible) in the industry-space over time. It was observed that the two 
technology vectors are becoming increasingly interdependent over time. These observations 
motivate the definition of four domains shown below in Figure 6.1, to be interpreted as four 
groups with similar characteristics (labelled I to IV). On the basis of Figure 6.1, we now 
provide a description of the unfolding industry dynamics of the telecom industry. 
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Domain I: High economic and low technological specialisation 
At first glance, domain I (see Figure 6.1 below) is very attractive since the firm is performing 
well in economic terms, and the technological specialisation is low, i.e. performance is 
achieved without extensive investments in new technological competences. Companies 
positioned in this group are Siemens and Bosch during all three periods, whereas GEC in 
1992 and Fujitsu in 1995 enter this domain. 
 
If competences are re-created (path a in Figure 6.1), there is no problem and the firm will 
move from domain I to domain II. In the absence of a re-creation of the firm’s competences, 
the technological basis of the firm’s economic specialisation may gradually erode. Eventually 
this scenario would lead towards the firm’s exit of the industry (path b in Figure 6.1). 
 
Domain II: High technological and low economic specialisation 
Domain II is not very attractive. It is characterised by firms possessing a relatively high 
degree of technological specialisation but little ability to convert this strong position into 
II
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i
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economic performance. Unless the firm acquires such ability, the firm’s economic 
performance is gradually eroded and it will sooner or later have to exit the industry (path d). 
However, in one particular instance a high technological specialisation may be used to create 
fall back positions as a safe guarding routine (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Domain II 
appears to be an unstable position that may be used as a stepping-stone towards future 
opportunities, e.g. a movement from domain II to III (along path c). This is not very likely 
because the maintenance of the competence base that is required is very high and will demand 
enough financial resources to prevent such a move. Considering the other alternative paths 
leading from II, the most likely movement appears to be along the technological vector to 
domain I (marked by i). This movement from II to I implies that the firm slowly erodes its 
competence base, either because it is unable to finance the required high level of 
technological competences necessary to move to III or because it decides to reap any possible 
surplus and divest. In summary, domain II is an unattractive and unstable location that does 
not provide a secure basis for long-term survival. Consistent with this viewpoint, no single 
telecom firm is located in this area during all of the three periods included in the present 
study. Philips and AT&T, however, temporarily locate in domain II. 
 
Domain III: High technological and economic specialisation 
At first sight, domain III seems very attractive because a high degree of specialisation in 
technological competence is accompanied by the necessary specialisation in turnover (a 
specialised customer base). As argued in the literature, however, the risk of obsolescence of 
existing competences through more attractive alternatives increases as the degree of 
specialisation increases. That is, domain III is characterised by a possible competence trap 
(marked by C.T in Figure 6.1) associated with a continued increasing refinement of the firm’s 
specialised competences. As mentioned in section 3 a competence trap associated with likely 
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failure (exit-paths g and h) becomes even more probable as the environmental dynamics 
increase. Because the loss of competences is the first effect of the competence trap, we 
believe path h is more likely than path g.  
 
A timely strategic re-organisation of the competence base to avoid a competence trap is 
associated with a movement from domain III towards domain I (path e in Figure 6.1). This 
path is associated with the erosion of competences as a short-term solution to remain a high 
performer. Nevertheless a move to domain I by way of path e may lead to the 
accomplishment of a new and successful accumulation of competences and a move towards 
domain II by way of path a. Path f (move from III to II) is associated with the obsolescence of 
a particular technological competence in terms of decreasing economic return.  
 
Domain III is therefore a relatively unstable domain, because it may either lead to a 
competence trap or to a strategic reorientation. Companies like Ericsson and Motorola are the 
only firms included in the present study to be located in domain III during all three periods. It 
is therefore interesting to examine whether these two companies have avoided the possible 
competence trap. For Ericsson25, the answer is apparently no. During recent years, Ericsson 
has: (1) outsourced a number of vital functions including production, (2) in its critical 
activities (associated with core competence) depended to a higher degree on external partners, 
and (3) experienced increasing R&D cost per sold unit. For Motorola the case is different, as 
it initiated a strategic reorientation through the Iridium project (that failed however) 
(Finkelstein and Sanford 2000). Both events are consistent with the suggested characterisation 
of domain III. 
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Domain IV: Low economic and technological specialisation 
Although apparently very unattractive, domain IV may be viewed in two ways: (1) as a 
position for entry or exit, or (2) as a low-commitment “listening post” where highly 
diversified companies may gain experience-based intelligence. Because the specialisation 
index measures specialisation as a share of the firm’s own activities relative to the activities 
of the market, a highly diversified firm may be characterised by a relatively low degree of 
technological specialisation and yet perform reasonably well. Such a firm may thus remain in 
domain IV over longer periods of time. Examples of such firms are Hitachi and Matsushita. 
Schmoch’s (1995) study did not include Hitachi, but listed Matsushita as a newcomer in 1989. 
The sustained position of Matsushita in domain IV reflects a highly diversified profile (see 
also appendix A). By contrast, Nokia represents the case of a firm entering the telecom 
market through domain IV (in 1989), and then proceeding to establish itself in domain III. 
This result is consistent with Schmoch’s (1995) findings. Whether Toshiba belongs to the first 
or the second group remains to be seen on more recent data. In Figure 6.1 we have only 
indicated one possible entry path from domain IV namely via domain I (path j). It is rather 
unsure how entry will proceed and remains for further research to be clarified.  
 
In summary, the external unfolding analysis provided an endogenously derived industry-space 
that allowed a descriptive assessment of the dynamics of the telecom industry. Based on the 
data of the sixteen companies it was possible to deduct a rather general picture of this 
dynamics. It was argued that domain II is inherently unstable and domain III becomes 
unstable as the basis of competition is altered (e.g. due to changes in customer preferences)26. 
                                                                                                                                                        
25
 For more detailed accounts of the Ericsson story see e.g. McKelvey and Texier (1997), Bernier (1996), Graetz 
(1996). 
26
 The more likely paths are visualized by arrows marked in bold, whereas less likely paths are marked with a 
dotted line. These different likelihood's lead us to the deduction of more vs. less stable domains. 
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By contrast, domain I is a very stable area as the tendency to move from both domain II and 
III towards domain I seems to dominate the alternative paths. 
 
For the telecom industry, it thus appears that domain I is rather stable and attractive. The 
problem with this conclusion is that the tendency to move towards domain I implies that 
competition among firms occupying this domain may drive profits towards zero. The firms in 
domain I may therefore use alternative strategies than technological specialisation in order to 
raise the costs of location. A possible alternative strategy is to pursue a high degree of 
technological specialisation in order to occupy domain III. The above assessment of the 
industry dynamics of the telecom industry further points to a number of dynamic drivers that 
may disrupt any possible equilibrium. 
 
More generally, we have shown how our proposed methodology can be used to derive an 
“industry space” that allows for identification of the determinants of the tendency to form 
groups, and to infer the stability of such groups of firms sharing similar conditions. Note here 
that the proposed methodology is generally applicable across industries. The derived industry-
space is specific to a particular industry, however. It must further be emphasised that the 
determinants of the tendency for firms to group in the industry-pace, the attribute- and 
performance-vectors, are endogenously derived and will therefore vary across industries. 
 
In the telecom industry, we have seen that the two attribute-vectors, R&D and patent-
specialisation overlapped to a degree that indicated that they could be treated as a single 
dimension of technology. This result must be expected to vary across industries. We further 
observed a rather high degree of interdependence (complementarity) between the technology-
vector and the performance-vector. Again, this result may differ across industries. The point is 
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that the proposed methodology unfolds the dynamics of a particular industry on the basis of 
the interactions among firms as they are expressed in the time-series used as input for the 
analysis. It is therefore important to select data that represent the key strategic attributes of the 
industry well.  For the telecom industry we have used R&D and patent-data as well as a 
measure of performance. For different industries, different variables will better capture the 
key strategic attributes. We see this as a strength of the proposed unfolding methodology.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The aim of the present paper was to search for patterns of relationships among key variables 
(such as R&D investments, technology and performance), to trace these patterns over time 
and thereby unfold the underlying industry dynamics. In order to pursue this aim, we 
extended previous uses of MDS to derive and assess a meaningful representation of an 
industry. We refer to such a representation of the industry as an “industry-space.”  
 
In order to further a more detailed assessment of the industry dynamics offered by previous 
studies, we applied what is known as external unfolding analysis.  That is, we used regression 
analysis to fit vectors representing firm-level strategic attributes and performance measures in 
the industry-space derived by MDS. By applying this procedure we obtained information on 
each firm’s strategy and its consequences. Note that the vectors as they were fitted in the 
industry space represent endogenously derived industry-level properties.  
 
By analysing how a firm’s position changes over time within this space, we were able to trace 
the industry dynamics as emerging patterns of relations among firms. By further applying the 
external unfolding analysis, we gained information about the changing relative position of the 
industry level attributes and performance vectors. As shown above, this information enabled a 
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detailed assessment of the industry dynamics created by the mutual interaction of the telecom 
firms. More generally, we see it as strength of the proposed unfolding methodology that even 
if it is generally applicable across industries, the derived industry-space reflects the dynamics 
of a particular industry. 
 
Our proposed methodology extends the approach originally introduced by Green and 
Carmone (1968) as well as the more recent use of MDS to assess possible groupings of firms. 
By adding the possibility of assessing the relative change of industry-level strategic 
dimensions we have further refined Green and Carmone’s (1968) outline of a methodology 
for the analysis of dynamic change. In particular we have used the telecom industry to 
illustrate how our proposed methodology can be used to analyse the unfolding industry 
dynamics within the telecom industry. We view our proposed methodology as a first step in 
providing the refined methods necessary to conduct empirical analyses, also of very dynamic 
industries. The next development of our proposed methodology would obviously depend on a 
larger scale empirical test. 
 
For the individual large firm, the present method can be applied without much difficulty as a 
strategic management tool. It allows the firm to trace its own potential strategies for the future 
as well as to identify and track the competitors of the industry closely. Thus, not only can the 
method improve the quality of existing management of technology but also provide a more 
thorough basis for identifying the competitors strategic moves. Through the concept of an 
industry space and the derived dynamic attributes the present study adds to previous 
conceptualisations of the R&D process. 
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Appendix A: The level of specialisation 
 1989 1992 1995 
 Patent R&D Turnover Patent R&D Turnover Patent R&D Turnover 
Ericsson 82.7 52.9 91.4 84.0 54.6 93.8 71.9 46.9 90.4 
NEC 61.8 28.7 27.7 40.3 21.1 39.9 23.4 17.3 24.1 
Nokia 3.2 -14.3 -18.9 67.9 39.3 64.9 72.9 47.7 83.8 
AT&T 72.7 34.9 18.5 61.2 34.3 7.7 58.1 36.9 86.0 
Fujitsu -38.4 -27.6 -27.2 -10.3 -5.0 -28.9 -57.9 -26.8 -31.5 
GEC -10.3 -14.8 -71.1 -8.7 -4.3 19.9 -29.6 -9.6 -10.8 
Siemens -8.4 -10.3 -0.8 -27.9 -14.1 29.6 -48.2 -20.4 -3.3 
Bosch -13.0 -17.2 7.9 -61.4 -34.2 30.1 -66.1 -32.9 -33.1 
Hitachi -88.9 -64.7 -98.2 -80.8 -50.8 -97.4 -89.3 -58.0 -98.3 
Motorola 79.9 43.1 46.5 69.0 40.1 85.8 39.7 26.0 78.1 
Alcatel    49.2 10.5 76.2 39.6 16.8 69.7 
IBM    -32.4 -16.5 -92.6 -41.6 -16.4 -74.2 
Philips Not available -27.4 -13.9 -94.2 -32.3 -11.2 -94.9 
Matsushita    -54.9 -29.8 -73.5 -71.7 -37.5 -89.7 
Sony    Not available -50.0 -21.6 -95.4 
Toshiba       -74.9 -40.5 -43.6 
 
